



NAM Journal of Social Sciences

Subject: Tarkāmṛta of
Jagadīśatarkālamkāra

Author: Anju P. P.
Research Scholar
Dept. of Sanskrit Nyaya
SSUS, Kalady.

*NAM Journal of Social
Sciences: A Scholarly
Peer-Reviewed Online
Journal of NAM Center
for Research and Local
Development, NAM
College, Kallikkandy,
Kannur, Kerala*

**MARCH 2021
VOLUME-1
ISSUE- 1**

Patron

Dr. K. K. Mohamed Kutty
Principal of NAM College

Chief Editor

Dr. Anas Edoli

Editorial Board

Dr. Joy Varkey

Dr. E.K. Munira Beebi

Dr. Jose M. V.

Priya Nair

Dr. K. K. Musthafa

Published by

**NAM Center for Research and
Local Development - Kannur**
www.namcollege.ac.in/journal

Tarkāmṛta of Jagadīśatarkālamkāra

The word darśana is derived from the root 'drś' (to see) applying the suffix lyut.¹ Literally the term darśana denotes seeing. Generally darśana is divided into two nāstikadarśana and āstikadarśana. Nāstikadarśana did not accept the authority of Vedas. They are Cārvākadarśana of Cārvāka, Jainadarśana of Vardhamāna Mahāveera, Bauddhadarśana of Sreebuddha. Āstikadarśana accept the authority of Vedas. They are six types, Sāmkhyadarśana of Kapila, Yogadarśana of Patañjali, Pūrvamīmāṃsa of Jaimini, Uttaramīmāṃsa of Badarayana. Vaiśeṣika darśana of Kaṇāda and Nyāyadarśana of Gautamamuni.

The Nyāya popularly signifies right or justice. The Nyāyaśāstra therefore the science of right judgment or true reasoning. The Nyāyasūtra is the first systematic work of Nyāya philosophy. It is written by Gautama. Later this system came to be regarded as the Prācīna Nyāya and Navyanyāya. The period between Gautama to Udananācārya is called Prācīna Nyāya period. Navyanyāya was introduced by Gaṅgeśa and Raghunātha. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya was the author of tattvacintāmaṇi. It was the first work of modern school of Hindu logic. It introduces a new era in the development of logic.

Jagadīśa Tarkālamkāra was the greatest expounder of doctrines of Navyanyāya. He flourished in the 17th century. Jagadīśa Tarkālamkāra was the 4th in descent from Sanātana Miśra, the father-in-law of the famous Caitanya. Caitanya was born in 1485 A.D. Sanātana must have lived about the same time. Allowing 30 years for each generation, we find that Jagadīśa was born about 1605 A.D.³ The date of his literary activity may be approximately fixed at about 1635 A.D.⁴ He finished his studies in logic under the academy of Bhavānanda Siddhānta Vāgīśa. He was the author of Tattvacintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-prakāśikā, Tattvacintāmaṇi- Mayūkha, Nyāyadarśa or Nyāyasāraṇī, Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā, Dravyabhāṣyatīkā, Nyāya-līlāvati- dīdhiti-vyākhyā.

Tarkāmṛta is written by Jagadeśa Tarkālamkāra. It is a prakaraṇa work. It is also a Navya Nyāya text. It is an important treatise on Vaiśeṣika philosophy. In this work seven categories of Viśeṣika and four pramāṇas of the Nyāya have been

combined. Tarkāmṛta begins with salvation to Vishnu. In first part of Tarkāmṛta called Viṣaya-kāṇḍa. Jagadīśa divides things into two kinds namely positive or (bhāva) and negative or abhāva. The positive things or bhāvas are substance (dravya), qualities (guṇa), action (karma), generality (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa). The negative things or abhāvas are of two kinds relative non-existence or samsargabhāva and reciprocal non-existence or anyonyābhāva. The relative non-existence or samsargābhāva is subdivided as antecedent non-existence (prāgabhāva) (2) subsequent non-existence (praddvamsābhāva) and absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva). Intellect is divided into two prama or valid knowledge and aprama or invalid knowledge. In this book aprama is explained at the time of explanation of intellect. Prama is explained posterior to abhāva.

The second part of Tarkāmṛta called Jñānakāṇḍa. It treats of right knowledge prama which is derived through four means of knowledge. Perception (pratyakṣa), Inference (anumāna), Comparison (upamāna) and Verbal testimony (śabda).

Perception

Perception is the cognition which arises from the contact of the sense organ with its object and which is unnameable non-erroneous and definitive.⁵ Perception is the instrument of perceptive cognition.⁶ According Nyāya there are six sense organs. There is one internal sense called mind. And five external senses namely the olfactory, the gustatory, the visual, the tactual and auditory. Perception is of two kinds indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) or determinate (savikalpaka) Indeterminate perceptive cognition is knowledge which is not possessed of a distinguishing attributes,⁷ as this is something. Determinate perceptive cognition is knowledge which is possessed of a distinguishing attribute⁸ as this is Dittha, this is a Brahmana, this is a black, this is a cook. The inter course are two kinds laukika and alaulika. Laukika – sannikarṣa is six kinds they are conjunction, conjoined-inherence, conjoined inherent inherence, inherence, inherent-inherence, and partikalarity. Alaulika sannikarṣa is three types. They are sāmānyalakṣaṇa or perception of classes, Jñānalakṣaṇa or acquired perception, and yogaja or intuitive perception. The first one is the perception of whole class of objects through the generic property perceived in any individual member of that class. The second one is the perception of an object which is in contact with sense through a previous knowledge of itself.

The last one is the intuitive perception of all objects past and further- due to some super-normal powers generated in the mind by profound meditation.

Inference

Inference is the instrument of inferential cognition.⁹ Inferential cognition is knowledge which is produced from consideration (paramarsah).¹⁰ Consideration is the knowledge of the indicatory mark being an attribute of the subject (pakṣah)¹¹ characterised by invariable concomitance, as the knowledge, This mountain is possessed of smoke which is pervaded or invariably accompanied by fire is consideration.¹² The mountain is possessed of fire is inferential cognition. Invariable concomitance is the certainty or invariability of co-existence in the form of where there is smoke, there is fire.¹³ Being an attribute of the subject consist in the pervaded or less extensive vyapyam being present on the mountain.¹⁴

Inference is of two kinds intended for oneself and intended for another of them, the inference intended for oneself is the cause of one's own inferential cognition.¹⁵ To explain the inferential having just by himself comprehended by means of respected observation, the invariable concomitance viz., where there is smoke there is fire in the case of kitchen etc.. a man goes near a mountain entertaining a doubt as regards the fire present on that mountain and seeing smoke on the mountain remembers the invariable concomitance viz., where there is smoke there is fire. After that the knowledge. This mountain is possessed of smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire is produced. This knowledge itself is designated as consideration of the indicatory mark. From that consideration the inferential cognition namely the knowledge. The mountain is possessed of fire is produced. This inference is called intended for oneself.

When a man having himself inferred fire from smoke employs a five membered syllogism. For the comprehension of another that is known as inference intended for another.¹⁶ For example the mountain is possessed of fire. Because it is possessed of smoke. Whatever is possessed of smoke all that is possessed of fire as the kitchen. And this mountain is possessed of smoke. Therefore it is possessed of fire. From the indicatory mark propounded by this five members of syllogism even another comprehends fire.

Five members of Syllogism

Pratijñā – This hill is fiery.

Hetu – Because it is smokey

Udāharaṇa – Whatever is smokey is fiery as a kitchen.

Upanaya - So is this hill (smokey)

Nigamana - Therefore this hill is fiery.

Another classification of an inference is called Kevalānvayi, Kevala-vyatireki and Anvaya vyatireki. Kevalānvayi when it is based on a middle term which is only positively related to the major term. A Kevalavyatireki inference is that in which the middle term is negatively related to the major term. An inference is called anvaya vyatireki when its middle term is both positively and negatively related to the major term.

A subject is that whose possession of the thing to be established is doubtful as the mountain (is the subject).¹⁷ When possession of smoke is the reason.¹⁸ A similar instance is that which definitely possesses the thing to be established as kitchen.¹⁹ In the same illustration a dissimilar or contrary instance is that which definitely possesses the negation of the thing to be established as a great pool in the same.

Hetvābhāsa (Fallacies of Reason)

Fallacies reason are of four types. Asiddha, Viruddha, Sandigdha, Anandhyavasita. Asiddha is fourfold, ubhayāsiddha, anyatarāsiddha, tadbhāvasiddha and anumeyāsiddha.

Comparison

Comparison is a knowledge of a thing through its similarity to another thing previously well known.²⁰ A man hearing from a forester that a bos gavaeus is like a cow resorts to a forest where he sees an animal like a cow. Having recollected what he heard he institutes a comparison, by which he arrives at the conviction that the animal which he sees is bos gavaeus. This is knowledge derived through comparison.

Verbal Testimony

Verbal Testimony (Śabda) is the instruction of the reliable person.²¹ The term āpta as signifying a person who has immediate knowledge of dharma (the moral law) who is capable of perceiving objects in their real form and who communicates real knowledge to the other out of comparison.

The first condition underscores the relationship between words, one implying the other, each word has an extension which helps to build up a sentence. A sentence is a combination of words having certain meaning. The construction of an intelligible sentence must conform to four conditions viz., expectancy (ākāṅkṣa), mutual fitness (yogyata), proximity (Sannidhi), and intended meaning (tātparyaya). Vrtti is two kinds Śakti and lakṣaṇa for example of sakti when we hear the word ghaṭa, we get the meaning of pot, which we used to fetch the water. The example for lakṣaṇa there are huts in a waves of Gāṅges. In this sentence we get the sense is that the huts are located in the bank of the river Gaṅga. Words are divided into four kinds. They are yogika, rūḍha, yoga-rūḍha, and yaugikarūḍha. Yogika when its meaning is solely determined by those of its component parts. Rūḍha is conventional when its meaning is determined by the whole, independently of the part meaning. Yogarūḍha when the meaning determined by the whole agrees with that determined by the parts. Yogika-rūḍhā when their meaning are determined either by the potency of the whole or by those of the parts. Lakṣaṇa is the secondary meaning of a word. It is the indirect or implied meaning is which we should understand a word. When its direct or primary meaning does not consistent with other word or the context. Lakṣaṇa divided into two Jahaswardha and ajahaswardha. He describes the verb to analysis the uses of tense and moods. He exemplifies plenty of instance to show its difference to indicate the present tense he gives instance of 'lat' A present action done prior to the current day he uses imperfect tense (lit). To indicate the future tense he uses the example of lṛt. Next he use instance for potential mood (vidhiling) and benedictine mood (āśrling)

Conclusion

Tarkāmṛta is written by Jagadīśa Tarkālamgkāra. It is an important treatise on Vaiśeṣika philosophy, In this work seven categories of Vaiśeṣika and four pramāṇas of the Nyāya are combined. Tarkāmṛta begins with salvation to Viṣṇu. The first part of Tarkāmṛta called Viṣayakāṇḍa. He divides things into two kinds, positive and negative. The positive things are substance, quality, action, generality and particularity. The negative things are two kinds, relative non-existence and reciprocal non-existence. The relative non-existence is subdivided as antecedent non-existence, subsequent non-existence and absolute non-existence. The second part of tarkāmṛta called Jñānakāṇḍa. It treats of right knowledge (prama) which is derived through four means of knowledge. Perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

Foot Notes

1. The Critical Study of Praśastapādabhāṣya, p.5.
2. A History of Indian Logic, p.40.
3. Ibid., p.469.
4. Ibid., p.469.
5. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4
6. Tatra prathyakṣajñānakaranam prathyakṣam TSA, p9.
7. Niṣprakārakam jñānam, nirvikalpam, ibid., 10.
8. Saprakārakam Jñānam Savikalpakam, ibid., 10.
9. Anumitikaraṇam anumānam, ibid., 11.
10. Paramarśajanyamjñānamanumiti, ibid., 11.
11. Vyāptiviśiṣṭapakṣadarmatajñānam paramarśaḥ, ibid., 11.
12. Yatha vahnivyapyavānāyam parvataḥ iti jñānam paramarśaḥ, ibid., 11
13. Yathra dhūmatatrāginiriti Sāhacaryaniyamo vyāpti, ibid., 12.
14. Vyāpyasyaparvatativṛttitvam pakṣadharmata, ibid., 12.

15. Svardham Sānumiti hethuḥ, ibid., 12
16. Yattu dhūmādagnumanumāya parapratiṭipathyartham pañcāvayavavakyaṃ prayuktam tatra parāthānumānam, ibid., 12
17. Sandigdhasādhyavan pakṣa, ibid.,
18. Nischitasādhyvan, sapakṣaḥ, ibid.,
19. Nischita sādhyābhāvavan vipakṣaḥ, ibid.,
20. Aṭhōpadeśaḥ śabdaḥ, TSA

